Strategic corporate social responsibility and value creation among large firms - Lessons from the Spanish experience by Husted, BW & Allen, DB
 
 
Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility and Value 
Creation among Large Firms 
 
Lessons from the Spanish Experience 
 
Bryan W. Husted and David B. Allen 
 
 
 
 
 
Can corporate social responsibility (CSR) be a source of good and a wellspring of innovation, 
competitive advantage and value creation for the firm? Although CEOs and government leaders 
insist in public that CSR projects create value for the firm, privately they admit that they do not 
know if CSR pays off. To address this question and drawing on experience for the Spanish 
context, we test one of the few efforts to model how the strategic management of CSR may 
contribute to improving firm profitability (Burke and Logsdon, 1996). To do this, we examine the 
impact of three strategic CSR variables -.visibility, appropriability, and voluntarism - on value 
creation among large Spanish corporations. The conclusions from these findings suggest that 
managers need to understand how CSR is similar to and different from other traditional corporate 
market activities if they are to pursue value creation through CSR. We also suggest avenues for 
future research to explain how CSR may be integrated into firm processes to create resources 
(assets) and capabilities (routines) that may lead to competitive advantage and superior 
economic performance. 
 
 
Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been defined in myriad ways. A common feature of 
many of the definitions is the proviso that firm activities can be considered as CSR when the 
firm under- takes ‘‘actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of 
the firm and that which is required by law’’.1 However, this traditional definition, which 
clearly separated market from non-market (or social) activities, has given way to a new 
understanding driven by growing stakeholder pressure for greater CSR: firms are being asked 
to provide more and more social pro- grams designed to alleviate the world’s ills as they are 
told that this will also lead to superior firm financial performance.2 
However, managers like British Petroleum’s Graham Baxter candidly worry that they just do 
not know whether CSR pays off. Baxter, in the wake of BP’s failed ‘‘green strategy’’ and the 
subsequent firing of John Browne, cautions that while ‘‘Throughout BP’s 100-year history, 
maintaining a positive working relationship with communities and broader society where we 
operate has been an important part of our success. the ‘CSR Bubble’ has become over-
inflated which, at worst, tries to create a parallel universe dangerously separate from 
business purpose and strategy.’’3 
In our own work with U.S., Spanish, German and British multinationals in the 
pharmaceutical, banking and telecom industries, top management has frequently expressed 
skepticism of enthusiastic, high-profile academics like Michael Porter who claim that CSR 
can be both  a source of good and a wellspring of innovation, competitive advantage and 
value creation for the firm. Man- agers rightly ask for clearer evidence of when and how non-
market social activities can be converted into value-creating market activities. 
 
  
 
After more than two decades of research on the relationship between 
 
CSR and firm financial performance, the results are mixed 
 
Unfortunately, academic studies have neither contributed significantly to our understanding 
of how CSR impacts on firm performance nor provided a compelling framework for the 
strategic management of CSR. After more than two decades of research on the relationship 
between CSR and firm financial performance, the results are mixed, at best: some studies show 
a positive relation- ship between the two; others, a negative relationship; and still others, no 
relationship.4 The reason for this failure is methodological: financial performance comes at the 
end of a long chain of mediating and independent variables. In other words, too many 
variables influence firm financial performance for us to isolate effectively the impact of CSR 
activities.5 Stated plainly, academics have been going about this the wrong way. 
We agree with those managers who ask for a more instrumental, pragmatic approach to 
meet the laudable goal of satisfying legitimate stakeholder claims while at the same time 
creating competitive advantage and shareholder value. Accordingly, we propose re-configuring 
non-market social activities as social-market activities as a necessary first step in exploring how 
to manage CSR for value creation. This is consistent with the long-standing view in strategic 
management that a positive relationship between firm activities and value creation is more 
likely to be achieved when executives design projects that seek competitive advantage. In 
practical terms, strategic management of non- market social activities turns an expense into 
an investment with a measurable potential return. 
However, we ought not to conclude blithely that managing CSR for profit is just like 
managing traditional market activities and that we can simply convert by decree non-market 
social activities into profitable goods and services. Salient and legitimate stakeholders may make 
demands on firms - e.g. General Motors must maintain pension commitments while 
competing against firms without such legacy commitments - such that some CSR activities 
provide opportunities for value creation while others do not. Evaluating firm CSR activities - 
strengthening and expanding those that provide the potential for gain while diminishing the 
impact of those that put the firm at a disadvantage - is one of the key tasks of CSR management. 
Successful strategic management of CSR allows firms to take into account legitimate stakeholder 
claims, focusing and expanding work in those areas where competitive advantage can be created, 
while assigning appropriate allocation of resources to meet social needs. A secondary benefit of 
successful CSR strategy is that it encourages firms to seek additional ways in which social action 
also leads to profit. 
The challenge, then, is how to model the strategic analysis of CSR. A promising approach 
was suggested in 1996 by Burke and Logsdon,6 who set out five strategic dimensions of 
CSR projects (visibility, appropriability, voluntarism, centrality, and proactivity) and posited 
that the strategic management of these dimensions in pursuit of competitive advantage 
would positively impact firm financial performance. 
The framework presupposes that we understand how non-market social activities are 
different from market activities. We start from the standard innovation scenario in which the 
potential for creating value via non-market social activities is enhanced when competing 
with firms that do not treat CSR as a source of competitive advantage. However, the social 
aspect of CSR activities makes additional demands on firm behavior; not only must the 
company provide product or service attributes that create value, it must also provide a social 
good. In other words, strategic CSR opens a competitive space in which there are new 
opportunities but also additional demands to be met. 
Two examples may help illustrate the challenge. In renewable energy, BP, the energy giant, 
was the first of the oil majors to go ‘‘green’’, and did so by announcing that this was a new 
strategy. Despite an initial round of praise, BP quickly came under pressure to meet raised 
stakeholder expectations. In fact, John Browne’s recent resignation was due, in part, to his 
failure to deliver both on profits and going green. Another well-known example of the 
challenges of meeting competitive and social goals is Benetton. For more than a decade 
Benetton claimed a competitive space in which they offered progressive social consciousness 
as part of their brand positioning. This worked well until a controversial advertising campaign 
using death row inmates confronted resistance in the United States and Sears dropped  the 
Benetton line of clothes. In response, Benetton abandoned its progressive social advertising 
and fired its long-term Advertising Director. In turn, the firm found itself attacked by its most 
loyal customers for being hypocrites. These customers did not accept the argument that the 
exigencies of business required the firm to make a change in market strategy. They 
demanded that Benetton fulfill both product and social issue customer demands. Since then, 
Benetton has been unable to reestablish its strategic position. 
 
 
Our research objective is to examine which strategic dimensions firms 
 
believe essential to creating value through  CSR 
 
 
With the dual nature of CSR in mind, we set out to consider how firms think about the 
strategic opportunities and demands of social action programs that link market objectives and 
non-market social objectives. To do so, we test Burke and Logsdon’s framework via a survey of 
Spain’s 500 largest firms. Our research objective is to examine which strategic dimensions firms 
believe essential to creating value through CSR. This knowledge, we argue, is necessary for the 
strategic management of CSR. 
The Burke and Logsdon framework provides a useful starting point for this work. The 
framework was proposed as a practical instrument for helping managers develop CSR 
strategies that ‘‘pay off’’; it was not a fully developed model with testable hypotheses. 
Accordingly, we have translated the framework into the resource-based view, and defined 
strategic CSR as the firm’s ability to: 1) pro- vide a coherent focus to a portfolio of firm 
resources and assets (centrality); 2) anticipate competitors in acquiring strategic factors 
(proactivity); 3) build reputation  advantage through customer knowledge of firm behavior 
(visibility); 4) ensure that the added value created goes to the firm (appropriability).7 
Voluntarism, we should note, is missing from this description of strategic CSR, though it is a 
key variable in CSR value creation. We will return to this issue below in the theory section of 
the paper. 
Given recent discussions of corporate citizenship, we should briefly discuss the 
relationship of strategic CSR to corporate citizenship. This task is made difficult by the fact 
that there is no consensus regarding the meaning of corporate citizenship. Some authors 
equate corporate citizenship with corporate social responsibility, while others seem to focus 
corporate citizenship specifically on the strategic aspects of CSR, much as we are doing in 
this article. Still others speak of citizenship as the responsibilities that corporations have with 
respect to their role as administrators in a system of citizenship.8 Thus, this paper on strategic 
CSR is more or less related to current conceptions of corporate citizenship, depending on the 
particular conception used. Since we test the Burke and Logsdon framework, we continue their 
usage and employ the term ‘‘strategic CSR’’, leaving aside debates about the meaning and 
scope of corporate citizenship. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we first set out in greater detail how 
CSR projects may help firms create value and develop hypotheses for three of the five 
strategic dimensions that seem to have an impact. We then discuss the research 
methodology, data analysis and results. In the discussion and conclusions section, we 
indicate the contribution of the individual strategic dimensions to value creation and 
implications of the results for firm strategy, management practice and public policy. We 
conclude with suggestions for future research. 
 
 
Theory 
 
In the strategic management literature, it is generally agreed that competitive advantage 
  
requires, in addition to superior firm resources and capabilities, a fit between the external 
environment and the strategic action of firms. Strategic action, in turn, it is argued, is driven by 
top management’s values, including commitment to both profit and social responsibility.9 
 
 
Strategic management researchers have asserted that CSR can  provide 
 
opportunities for innovation 
 
 
However, asserting that values are the basis for management principles and action does not 
mean that increased social responsibility is the best or easiest route to value creation and 
profitability. The first step in finding this route, as we indicated earlier, is to move beyond the 
simplistic approach that CSR is inherently profitable. Strategic management theory has 
consistently argued that the key to success resides in creating competitive advantage which, 
skillfully managed, results in value creation. Value is created when consumers are willing to pay 
a premium for the firm’s products and services based on its involvement in and position with 
respect to specific social issues. Value creation occurs when firm resources are combined in 
new ways so as to increase the potential productivity of those resources.10 Thus, value 
creation is necessarily about innovation. Strategic management researchers have asserted 
that CSR can provide opportunities for innovation.11 
Yet, just as all market-based projects do not create value, not all CSR projects will create 
value for the firm.12 Many CSR projects, in fact, increase costs, and although they may be 
positively evaluated by different stakeholder groups, stockholders may see the value of their 
shares diminished. For ex- ample, The Body Shop is frequently cited as a classic case of 
joining products and CSR. Unfortunately, The Body Shop also found that CSR could increase 
costs significantly. Intent on maintaining its commitment to a broad range of local suppliers, 
manufacturing costs skyrocketed, and as other firms copied its products and outsourced to 
Asia, The Body Shop’s profits plummeted. Finally, Anita Roddick was forced to bring in 
management willing to put profit before CSR. 
In effect, the challenge CSR faces is an elegant inversion of the old conundrum of social 
cost.13 
Rather than worrying about how to compensate others for harm done in the process of 
creating value for our business, we need to figure out how social benefit creates value 
rather than cost for business firms. 
Explaining, then, how social action creates value remains a key stumbling block to a theory of 
the firm that incorporates CSR. Our approach to this problem is to treat CSR as a 
strategic value creator. In our research, we ask managers to detail their understanding of their 
firms’ analysis of the social issues (stakeholder) environment and of how these firms create 
value through CSR projects. Specifically, the Burke and Logsdon model sets out, as we outlined 
above, five strategic dimensions of CSR projects that may affect the ability to create value: 
visibility, appropriability, voluntarism, centrality, and proactivity. In this paper, we examine the 
hypothesis that firms with social (CSR) projects designed and  managed to create greater 
visibility, appropriability, and voluntarism are more likely to undertake advantageous 
reconfigurations of resources and capabilities and hence create greater value for the firm. It is 
important to note, moreover, that a firm need not successfully apply all the variables in order 
to create value; one of the key objectives of the research is to deter- mine which of the 
variables are currently being employed by firms. 
In Table 1, we provide a comparison of the strategic CSR approach proposed by Burke 
and Logsdon with traditional strategy and traditional CSR based on the original five dimensions 
of their model. 
Below, we examine three of the five dimensions in more detail and set out a hypothesis of 
the relationship of each dimension to value creation. We limit our discussion to these three 
dimensions given that our preliminary research indicates that centrality and proactivity do 
not  affect value creation in the Spanish context.14 
 
 
Visible CSR activities may affect the reputation of the firm positively 
 
 
Visibility is the extent to which social activities may be observed by the firm’s stakeholders. 
Visible CSR activities may affect the reputation of the firm positively. Research has 
demonstrated that a good corporate reputation has a significant potential for value creation 
and is difficult to replicate.15 Reputation is a key competitive advantage in markets where 
product differentiation is difficult, attracting superior workers and providing leverage for 
managing stakeholders.16 However, the decision to leverage CSR visibility is not comfortable 
for all firms. Neopets, a California based 
 
 
 
Table 1. A Comparison of Traditional CSR, Strategic CSR, and Traditional Strategy 
 
Strategic 
Dimension
s 
Different Approaches to CSR and Strategy 
 
Traditional CSR Traditional Strategy Strategic CSR 
 
Visibility Irrelevant: Doing good is its 
own reward e and is 
profitable in the long run. 
 
Appropriability Irrelevant: Doing good is 
its own reward e and 
profitable in the long run. 
Voluntarism Participate in social action 
beyond that demanded by 
the firm’s interests and the 
law. 
Centrality Irrelevant: Doing good is 
tied to social need and not 
to core business mission. 
Build customer awareness 
of product and brand. 
 
 
Manage supplier, 
customer, and competitor 
relations to capture value 
added for firm. Firm 
innovation based on ability 
to learn: non e 
deterministic behavior. 
Create value via product/ 
service innovation. 
Building customer and 
stakeholder awareness 
of product with CSR 
value added. 
Manage stakeholder 
relations to capture value 
added for the firm. 
Participate in social 
action beyond that 
demanded by law. 
Create value via product/ 
service innovation linked 
to social issues. 
Proactivity Anticipate changes in 
social issues. 
First-mover advantage. Anticipate changes in 
social issues that present 
market opportunities. 
  
company that has developed an on-line virtual pet community with over 25 million members 
and one of the world’s most visited websites, is regularly involved in a broad range of CSR 
activities; however, they deliberately do not publicize these activities and consider CSR 
activities to be part of ‘‘giving something back to the community’’ and ‘‘something you do, 
but don’t publicize’’. Top management at Neopets would consider it simply inappropriate to 
look to make money out of doing the right thing.17 
Taking precisely the opposite approach, Telefonica, the Spanish telephone multinational, has 
incorporated CSR directly in value creation as part of its widely publicized reputation 
strategy. In 2002, Telefonica’s President, Ce´sar Alierta, decided to integrate CSR into the firm’s 
corporate strategy, establishing a fully staffed Corporate Reputation Department charged 
with actively seeking publicity for CSR activities. The firm’s global reputation project set out 
CSR objectives throughout the world, and established IT systems to measure CSR media 
impact and reputation gains in the belief that reputation translates into increased sales.18 
Telefonica’s top management is convinced that greater visibility for CSR projects enhances 
firm reputation and customers will be willing to pay a price premium for the firm’s products or 
services. An additional expected benefit to CSR visibility is consolidation of Telefonica’s 
position with regulators, the investment community and other non-market  stakeholders. 
Although the analysis of value creation is more complex than in traditional market activities, 
CSR projects can be a source of competitive advantage. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1. The greater the visibility of a firm’s CSR projects, the greater the potential for 
value creation through such projects. 
 
 
One of the kinds of appropriability that is especially relevant  to value 
 
creation  is product  differentiation 
 
 
In the context of CSR, appropriability may be defined as the ability of the firm to extract 
economic benefits from a social project. One of the kinds of appropriability that is especially 
relevant to value creation is product differentiation. Such product differentiation can be 
created by endow- ing a product with CSR attributes (product innovation) or developing the 
product through CSR- consistent processes (process innovation). In either case, the firm 
creates a new market for such CSR products with consumers who are willing to pay a price 
premium for products with CSR attributes. 
For example, Patagonia, the California-based outdoor and sportswear manufacturer, 
represents a firm that has created a new market for its CSR products. Patagonia sets out to be 
an environmen- tally friendly supplier of outdoor gear, and began manufacturing its garments 
with recycled poly- ethylene terephthalate (PET).  From the beginning, Patagonia’s marketing 
has focused on the environmental-friendly dimensions of its products e e.g., organic cotton 
e and their innovative improvements (mostly patented and trademarked) motivated by the 
drive to be more environmentally friendly. Patagonia’s clothes sell at about 50% or more than 
competitors such as LL Bean and Eddie Bauer.19 The firm has maintained its competitive 
advantage by remaining focused on the appropriability of its social projects by both creating 
CSR products and pricing them above substitute offerings. 
In Spain, Bosques Naturales, a forestry development company, and MRW, a package 
delivery company, have focused their corporate strategies around the appropriability of CSR 
strategies. It is vital to keep in mind that appropriation of rents is, in effect, a measure of the 
firm’s ability to make sure that the potential value created actually goes to the firm and not to 
others in the market environment. In the cases of Bosques Naturales and MRW, appropriability 
has been linked carefully to strategic elements implicated directly in value creation, as we 
explain below in our discussion of voluntarism. 
Hypothesis 2. The greater the appropriability of a firm’s CSR projects, the greater the potential 
for value creation through such projects. 
 
Voluntarism refers to the sense in which social activities are undertaken freely, because firms 
want to, rather than as a result of legal constraints or fiscal incentives. In discussing strategic 
initiatives, this is usually not a consideration; strategy theory assumes that the active pursuit 
of competitive advantage is voluntary. Accordingly, in our introduction when we described 
strategic CSR in terms of the resource-based view, we omitted voluntarism. Thus, the 
inclusion of voluntarism as an in- dependent variable in strategic CSR requires some 
additional explanation. 
 
 
Voluntarism recognizes that there is something fundamentally different between market activities and non-
market CSR projects 
 
 
 
Voluntarism recognizes that there is something fundamentally different between market 
activities and non-market CSR projects. Business firms are designed to take advantage of 
market opportunities; for this reason, until recently, strategic management theory largely 
ignored non-market CSR projects in value creation beyond recognizing the importance of 
values and corporate culture in developing internal consistency and employee 
commitment.20 However, the inclusion of CSR projects in relation to value creation opens 
strategic opportunities  once we recognize that all firm activities may be a source of value 
creation. 
Within the CSR literature, the opposite has normally been assumed e firms do not, and 
should not, pursue competitive advantage via CSR. Burke and Logsdon, in their attempt to 
provide man- agers with a practical approach to CSR and value creation, were pioneers in 
recognizing that, in an environment where other firms do not seek competitive advantage via 
CSR activities, the decision to voluntarily go beyond legally mandated social action can 
become a source of value creation. In the Burke and Logsdon model, CSR voluntarism 
becomes economically rational e a source of competitive advantage e when it is linked to 
the other strategic dimensions, hence allowing firms to create unique resources and 
capabilities valued by customers and difficult to imitate.21  At a time when academic 
research and  the popular  press were focused on  making sweeping claims that CSR was 
good for profit, the Burke and Logsdon model was one of the few attempts to say how that 
could be done. 
Once again, as a practical example, MRW is exceptionally useful. In the package 
transportation business, competition has largely focused on reducing the cost of fast and 
efficient delivery. MRW’s strategy has consisted in treating fast and efficient low-cost delivery as 
a common denominator for those competitors who will survive, while developing an array of 
CSR product attributes for multiple customer groups. For example, MRW offers free package 
delivery once a month to the families of Spanish students overseas, to the handicapped, to 
the elderly in residences over 50 kilometers away from family, and so on. MRW sees its CSR 
program as a broad range of voluntary behaviors that it expects other firms not to match. 
Many of these beneficiaries become MRW customers; still other customers recognize MRW’s 
ability to provide specialized services to meet specific customer segments. 
However, the original argument of Burke and Logsdon with respect to voluntarism does not 
settle the matter. Work by Michael Porter and his colleagues suggests that legal constraints, 
such as environmental regulation, can actually spur innovation.22  In other words, 
involuntary constraints can provide firms with the incentive to innovate, especially with respect 
to social and environmental problems. Thus, the relationship of voluntarism to value creation is 
uncertain. There are reasons to believe that it may foster value creation; however, there are 
also good reasons to believe that con- strained action may also help to create value. The 
impact of this variable may be either positive or negative and may in fact depend upon specific 
  
contexts within which firms operate. Thus, in order to accommodate either possibility, we 
propose: 
 
 
Hypothesis 3. The voluntariness of CSR projects may either increase or decrease the 
potential for value creation through such projects. 
 
Methods 
 
Data collection 
After some deliberation, we decided on asking for perceptual data from the top management 
individual responsible for CSR activity at the firm. Previous studies have principally relied on 
aggregate measures of financial performance that have provided inconclusive evidence for a 
CSR-financial performance linkage. Accordingly, we have focused on the firm project level in 
order to discover how value is created by strategic CSR. 
We began this paper by stating that ‘‘managers don’t know if CSR pays off’’. As we argued 
earlier, there is no consensus that CSR can, or even should, be managed for profit, just as 
other business processes are managed for profit. As a result, well-intentioned CSR researchers 
have sought to find a way to demonstrate CSR profitability without having to claim that 
management takes strategic action to create value. This research agenda did not succeed 
because it could not specify how competitive advantage and value are created. In order to do 
so, we have chosen to focus on top management, precisely because they are in the best 
position to explain the strategic intent of their portfolio of social action projects. 
 
 
It is crucial  to test the extent to which top management  seeks competitive advantage and value 
creation via CSR in an uncertain 
environment 
 
 
 
In sum, given that most managers do not know whether CSR pays off, we consider it 
crucial to test the extent to which top management seeks competitive advantage and value 
creation via CSR in an uncertain environment. Such a test would be unnecessary if we were to 
ask, for example, about marketing strategy; it is hard to imagine the Executive Vice-President for 
Marketing of a large Spanish company admitting that the firm does not consider marketing a 
source of competitive advantage and that he is not sure how to create competitive 
advantage via marketing. 
Working from managerial intent requires accepting certain trade-offs. By shifting to a 
more micro focus, we also leave behind more objective indicators of value creation. On the 
project level, one would almost have to engage in a cost-benefit analysis of each project in order 
to determine the value created. Firms do not yet engage in such fine-grained evaluation of their 
CSR projects. Given the current state of the art of CSR management and reporting, we decided 
that we needed to rely on the perceptions of the managers responsible for CSR regarding the 
strategic goals of CSR projects. Such perceptions of firm benefits and of the quality of 
stakeholder relations may be biased. In response to this issue, we have applied the necessary 
methods to control for possible bias. 
Support for using perceptual managerial data rather than external stakeholders and other 
secondary databases comes from the theoretical literature and from practical research 
issues. There is considerable theoretical support  for using perceptual data.23  If, in fact, 
managerial decision- making is driven by the beliefs of top management, it makes sense to ask 
how management perceive the environment and the extent to which they believe they are 
responding to CSR challenges in a strategic fashion. 
The managers  we queried are well aware of their  firm’s PR and 
 
marketing programs for CSR and corporate reputation 
 
 
On a practical level, external databases of CSR and reputation surveys in Spain principally 
ask top management which firms they most admire. The resultant reputation and CSR 
rankings overweight firm size and profitability. External stakeholder groups, in particular NGOs, 
rarely deal with a large cross-section of firms and either speak favourably of partners with 
whom they collaborate or negatively of large firms that  have conflicts with specific 
stakeholders. However, the managers we questioned are well aware of their firm’s PR and 
marketing programs for CSR and corporate reputation.  These managers from the kinds of 
large companies we surveyed are well aware of their rankings in the CSR and reputation 
surveys. Our use of perceptual measures serves the purpose of telling us the extent to 
which managers seek to communicate with stakeholders and convince them that the firm is 
socially responsible. 
In short, while external databases and stakeholders may provide insight into firm behaviour 
regarding social issues, these sources do not measure the strategic import of stakeholders 
for firms nor how firms seek to create value through CSR. This can only be done by asking top 
management itself. We are aware, nonetheless, of the limitations of our data and perceptual 
measures; our results must be handled with caution, inviting further research, awaiting the 
moment when more fine- grained, objective data will be available. 
A survey instrument was developed to measure the basic constructs of value creation, 
visibility, appropriability, and voluntarism. We include the items used to measure these 
constructs in Appendix 1. Each of these items was measured using a five-point Likert scale. 
The face validity of the instrument was determined by a detailed examination of the 
instrument  by ten academics and business people who reviewed the instrument  items for 
clarity. A small pilot study was then carried out and the preliminary results found the 
measures to be robust. 
In addition to the variables of theoretical interest, CSR researchers have emphasized the 
need to control for firm size, risk, and industry. Firm size was measured by the number of 
employees. Industries were classified according to the Spanish system of industrial 
classification. We used a dummy variable for industry. We also included the debt ratio 
(debt/assets) as our measure of risk. 
Firms were selected from the Dicodi database of Spanish firms, published by Equifax 
Iberica. It consists of a total of almost 50,000 firms throughout the country. Data collection 
was carried out from April to September 2002. We sent the survey to the 500 largest firms in 
the database as measured by number of employees. We focused on the largest firms 
because they were more likely to have engaged in CSR activity. We telephoned all the firms to 
identify who in the top management team would be the best person to respond to the survey. 
110 surveys were completed either after the initial mailing or as a result of the follow-up. This 
represents a response rate of 22.0%. As a further control, in approximately half of the cases, 
we spoke directly to the individual filling out the survey to confirm that they understood the 
purpose of the survey and would be able to provide accurate data. All the surveys were 
reviewed as well by two researchers for inconsistencies in the data, response patterns and 
outliers. 
Sixty-three firms were in service industries and forty-seven were in manufacturing. The 
firms came from such diverse industries as mining and natural resources (9), heavy 
manufacturing and chemicals (19), light manufacturing and consumer products (14), energy 
and construction (5), commerce (14), financial services, telecommunications, and 
transportation (32), and other services (17). The firms had an average of 4,260 employees, 
ranging from 277 to 37,510 employees. 
 
Data analysis 
The hypotheses were analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. The 
dependent variable was value creation. The independent variables were visibility, 
  
appropriability, and voluntarism. Since the dependent variable is continuous and the data 
are cross-sectional, such a model appeared appropriate. Following standard procedure in 
CSR research, we controlled for company size, risk, and industry. 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for the variables. The correlation matrix suggests a 
significant correlation between voluntarism and visibility. These significant correlations raise the 
possibility of multicollinearity, which violates one of the assumptions for OLS. Multicollinearity 
occurs when any independent variable is highly correlated with any of the other independent 
variables. The effect of multicollinearity is to depress the significance of the affected variables. 
Nevertheless, the severity of multicollinearity needs to be tested more thoroughly. 
We undertook tests to demonstrate the reliability and validity of the constructs, and tests 
to detect problems of common-method variance, non-response bias, heteroskedasticity, and 
multicollinearity. The results of these tests demonstrated the robustness of the variables and 
that the assumptions for OLS regression were not violated. The results of these tests appear 
in Appendix 2. 
 
 
Results 
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. In all of the models we included the control 
variables. Following the resource-based view definition set out in the introduction, in model 1, 
we introduced the control variables and appropriability.  In model 2, we added visibility. 
Finally, voluntarism was introduced in model 3. The results appear in Table 3. The coefficients 
of the variables indicate the impact of each variable on value creation. For example, in model 
5, the coefficient of 0.22 for appropriability means that a one-unit increase in appropriability 
increases value creation by 0.22 units. 
Generally speaking the control variables were not significant or only marginally significant. 
The sole exception was risk measured as debt in model 3, which was significant at the 0.05 
level. The heavy manufacturing and chemical firms did appear to be marginally significant. 
These firms typically have had environmental problems, which may explain why they have a 
greater, negative impact on value creation than other industries. In terms of the independent 
variables, appropriability, visibility, and voluntarism were at least significant at the 0.05 level. 
However, voluntarism had the opposite sign than that expected by Burke and Logsdon, in 
support of the Porter hypothesis. The addition of appropriability, visibility, and voluntarism 
all increased the explanatory power of the model significantly as indicated by the change in 
R2 and the F-statistic. 
 
 
Table 2. Correlations 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Value creation     
2. Appropriability 0.45**    
3. Visibility 0.42** 0.28**   
4. Voluntarism -0.56** -0.34** 0.26*  
5. Debt -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.16 
6. Firm size -0.09 -0.01 -0.11 0.09 
7. Agriculture and 
Mining 
-0.04 0.05 -0.12 -0.08 
8. Heavy 
Manufacturing, 
Chemicals 
-0.06 0.17 0.02 0.06 
9. Equipment, 
Consumer 
Products 
-0.10 -0.22** 0.07 0.08 
10. Energy, Water, 
Construction 
-0.03 -0.09 -0.27** 0.10 
11. Commerce 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.01 
12. Financial Services 
and 
Telecommunicatio
ns 
-0.03 -0.11 0.01 -0.10 
13. Other Services 0.12 0.11 0.08 -0.02 
 
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.     
 
 
Table 3. Results of O.L.S. Regression  Analysis1 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Constant) .209 (.946) .222 (.894) .762 (.792) 
Debt -.694 (.646) -.648 (.610) -1.192* (.547) 
Firm Size -.132 (.089) -.102 (.085) -.073 (.075) 
Agriculture and Mining -.660 (.476) -.444 (.454) -.652 (.401) 
Heavy Manufacturing, Chemicals -.680† (.367) -.607† (.348) -.561† (.371) 
Equipment, Consumer Products -.140 (.334) -.239 (.317) -.167 (.279) 
Energy, Water, Construction .064 (.570) .468 (.552) .557 (.485) 
Commerce .077 (.354) .108 (.335) .200 (.294) 
Other Services .006 (.323) -.059 (.305) .032 (.269) 
Appropriability .427*** (.095) .342*** (.094) .222* (.086) 
Visibility  .333*** (.102) .243** (.091) 
Voluntariness   -.445*** (.090) 
R2 .250 .340 .498 
Change in R2 .250 .090 .158 
Change in F 2.967** 10.713** 24.527*** 
†p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < .001. 
1 Coefficients (standard errors appear in parentheses). 
 
 
Discussion 
As is the case in many prescriptive strategy models, Burke and Logsdon set out five 
independent variables which ideally would all positively align to create value. However, only 
three of the five variables (visibility, appropriability, and voluntarism) are perceived by 
Spanish firms to be related to value creation. In the following discussion, we explain why we 
believe this to be so. 
Visibility is clearly understood to be related to value creation. To the extent that consumers 
and other stakeholders are perceived to observe CSR activity, they are able to reward firms for 
their participation. A greater presence of CSR programs in the media and a favorable firm 
image appear to have a positive impact on the ability of the firm to generate value through 
increased customer loyalty, the attraction of new customers, and the development of new 
products and markets. The visibility results are clear and direct. It is likely that this is a 
reflection of the perception that many firms hold regarding the contribution of CSR to firm 
reputation.  
 
 
Firms perceive that designing CSR projects with the intent to generate 
 
benefits is necessary for value creation 
 
 
Appropriability also significantly affects the creation of value through CSR projects. In 
other words, firms perceive that designing CSR projects with the intent to generate benefits 
is necessary for value creation. Thus, to the extent that large Spanish firms undertake CSR, 
  
they are aware that they should design them in ways that create economic benefits; they 
recognize that since markets are competitive, firms could benefit from differentiating products 
with CSR attributes. Once again, we should keep in mind that if we were considering market 
product and service activities, we would expect ALL firms to assign importance to designing 
projects to create value. 
As predicted, voluntarism is an essential element for the creation of value, but not in the 
direction hypothesized by Burke and Logsdon. They thought that greater voluntarism would 
lead to greater creation of value from strategic CSR projects. On the contrary, and in 
accordance with the Porter hypothesis, among large Spanish firms, value creation is 
associated with constraints such as legal requirements, industry practice, and fiscal incentives. 
These results suggest that large Spanish firms are more likely to create value from CSR 
projects when such projects are perceived to arise as the result of industry, fiscal, and 
regulatory constraints. 
The results indicate a panorama in which firms want to benefit from CSR and understand 
its strategic importance, but are in an early competitive phase in which first-movers believe that 
simply being in the market with a CSR product is an achievement in itself. At the same time, 
there is a prevailing social climate in which it is institutionally expected that firms will actively 
talk about how important CSR is to firm performance. Telefonica, for example, has 
incorporated CSR within its corporate reputation area with the specific goal of encouraging 
the inclusion of CSR in company-wide strategic planning across its divisions. At the same 
time, Telefonica executives have shown striking honesty in recognizing that business-unit 
managers too often confuse CSR with regulation and find it difficult to see the connection 
between real business opportunities and CSR. Within Spain, many see CSR as necessary to 
reputation building in a market where product differentiation is nearly impossible. At the same 
time, in Latin America, regulators have required Telefonica and its affiliates to provide services 
that are not profitable, particularly in rural areas, so that CSR may be assumed as a necessary 
cost of being in certain markets. Nonetheless, rural farmers in developing countries have 
become a profitable segment for mobile telephone operators. 
It is likely that this complex and contradictory competitive environment is reflected in the 
positive results for visibility (closely related to the positive reputation effects associated with 
CSR) and appropriability (directly related to managing stakeholders for value creation) - as 
well as the importance given to merely meeting non-voluntary requirements. 
 
 
There is significant lag in implementing strategic management of 
 
social action activities that go beyond legal requirements 
 
 
The overall picture painted by these results seems to indicate that, despite the 
dependence on non-voluntary CSR activities among large Spanish firms for creating value 
through CSR, firms nonetheless perceive that CSR projects will create value when they are 
constrained to undertake such projects and develop such projects in ways that are 
designed to generate economic benefit, particularly when CSR projects are highly visible to 
the public. However, although Spanish firms appear to understand some of the strategy 
principles involved in CSR value creation, there is significant lag in implementing strategic 
management of social action activities that go beyond legal requirements. One possible 
reason is that the complexities of managing strategic CSR e the dual demands of tangible 
competitive advantage and social action - discourage firms. 
 
 
Conclusions: CSR, public policy, future directions 
An understanding of the conditions under which CSR may create value is crucial to 
developing a theory of strategic CSR. All firm activities may add value in the moment that 
they reduce costs, create product differentiation, or move customers to buy from one firm 
rather than another. CSR is an opportunity to re-configure the competitive landscape as well 
as to develop distinctive and dynamic resources and capabilities. 
CSR also provides a possibility for innovation. However, it is not a given that CSR 
innovation will either produce competitive advantage or value creation. To understand how 
this may be the case, we have operationalized the strategic management of CSR and CSR 
value creation and developed hypotheses about how CSR can contribute to improved firm 
performance. 
Though Spanish firms state that they understand the potential for CSR to contribute to value 
creation, they do not yet know how to re-orient non-market CSR projects toward value creation. In 
other words, there is a declaration of intentions that has yet to be met by action. This is not just an 
issue in Spain, however. Civil society organizations such as Business for Social Responsibility and 
The Global Compact network, continually express concern that firms know the right things to say, 
do some of the right things, but doubt that firms truly believe that CSR represents a business 
opportunity. 
 
 
We sorely need proof that CSR can be managed for value creation 
 
 
In fact, if firms truly were convinced, the recent attack on CSR in The Economist might not 
have produced such an uproar and outpouring of protest.24 We sorely need proof that CSR 
can be man- aged for value creation. Anomalous situations, such as the Spanish case, in 
which large firms perceive benefits from involuntary constraints such as governmental 
regulation, tax incentives, and industry pressure, only raise more questions. One possible 
explanation is that large Spanish firms are less CSR sophisticated than the U.S. companies 
that served as the context for the original work by Burke and Logsdon. On the other hand, as 
we argued above, it may be that Spanish firms perceive a potential danger to value creation in 
doing good or believe that CSR is too difficult to man- age as a competitive advantage. By the 
same token, the strong influence of non-voluntarism in the study suggests that much of this 
CSR activity may not be deeply rooted in corporate values and traditions. 
These findings have important implications for public policy. In Spain, local and national 
governments have all gotten involved in CSR activities. The city of Barcelona has its ‘‘Proyecte 
RSC’’ (CSR Project) based on voluntary measures, although public works projects frequently 
include CSR measures. The national government passed the ‘‘ley de transparencia’’ 
(Transparency Law) in December 2003 and has progressively toughened corporate 
governance and reporting standards for firms that trade on the Madrid Stock Exchange. 
Various measures to require additional reporting and standards are currently in process in the 
Spanish legislature. European Union measures affecting principally MNEs remain voluntary. 
Green papers and communications extolling the virtues of CSR have appeared in 2001, 2002, 
2003 and 2006 as pressure from NGOs for binding legislation grows. At this point, the only 
remaining impediment to new legislation is expressed preference in the European Union for 
voluntary accords in business regulation. 
As governments, the Spanish among them, threaten to pass legislation mandating CSR 
activity and social and environmental reporting, there is likely to be a further increase in and 
dependence on non-voluntary obligations. Irrespective of one’s view of this type of regulation, 
it will lead to increased CSR activity. Whether the legislation will encourage firms to seek 
competitive advantage and value creation via CSR is a separate, though vital question. 
 
 
 
Focusing on even just one of the strategy variables…may be 
 
sufficient to create value for the firm 
 
 
 
The study has important implications for managers, as well. Clearly, in order to increase 
value creation from CSR projects, such projects must be designed specifically to accomplish 
that objective. An essential part of capturing that value is by making sure that such projects 
are visible. The evidence supports the view that focusing on even just one of the strategy 
  
variables, in particular visibility, may be sufficient to create value for the firm. 
Some caution is warranted. When CSR may be managed for visibility (reputation) in the 
absence of compliance, the possibilities for ‘‘green wash’’ emerge. The Global Compact itself 
has become sensitive to charges of ‘‘blue wash’’ as environmentalist and human rights NGOs 
find MNEs especially adept at putting forward a good looking CSR program while continuing 
with the same old practices worldwide. In Southern Europe, where it is common to sign 
accords with high standards but fall short on enforcement, firms seem especially vulnerable to 
opportunism in relation to CSR. Companies that meet voluntary standards may be those that 
see a benefit from them, especially in formerly regulated industries and/or consumer goods 
industries in which product and service differentiation is difficult and reputation with 
regulators and consumers is a key competitive advantage. Further research into linking 
regulation, reputation, and CSR behavior is required if we are to understand more fully how 
companies perceive the competitive advantages available through CSR and what competitive 
actions they take. 
Firm perception of value creation via CSR will also depend on the extent to which managers 
understand how to integrate CSR into firm business processes; otherwise, CSR will remain for 
many a necessary, though sometimes uncomfortable appendage whose principal role is to 
ward off un- pleasant NGOs and potential public relations disasters. Firms which truly 
integrate CSR into firm market activities, e.g., MRW, remain few. The authors of this article 
have talked with many in top management responsible for CSR in Spanish MNEs, and 
most admit privately that they are on shaky ground managing CSR risks and opportunities. 
Our research confirms this uncertainty and points to the need for additional research on how 
firms actually manage CSR. Unfortunately, empirical data from independent sources is 
unreliable and there is almost no case-based research that truly delves into CSR behavior. 
This is not surprising; few firms are prepared to have their CSR programs evaluated in 
conjunction with other activities that may not shed a positive light on firm behavior. These 
limitations must be overcome, so that we can move CSR research forward toward 
understanding how CSR is integrated into corporate identity and corporate behavior. 
This study also makes important contributions to research by providing a basis for 
operationalizing the strategic dimensions of CSR projects. The Burke and Logsdon model 
appears to be useful in understanding value creation via CSR projects. Does national 
context, including laws and culture, affect the strength and direction of the impact of the 
Burke and Logsdon variables? This test in Spain suggests that other moderating variables 
must be taken into account. A fundamental objective of future research should be to improve 
the model and provide managers with better tools for strategic assessment of CSR activities. 
We should keep in mind, as well, that Burke and Logsdon’s model was one of the first attempts 
to set out what variables firms ought to manage if they are to achieve strategic success in CSR. 
This, in itself, was a significant contribution, especially when we consider that at the time, 
neither researchers nor firms were prepared to consider CSR as a source of competitive 
advantage. This is consistent with the professional management literature in which influential 
strategic management models (e.g., Porter’s generic strategies) have frequently been proposed 
without setting out testable propositions, and academics later come forward to test the 
models. 
Accordingly, we ought not to be surprised that the results of our research reconfigure key 
elements proposed by Burke and Logsdon, demonstrating the extent to which strategic 
CSR varies from traditional strategy. For example, it appears that firms approach CSR value 
creation differently from market activities in that visibility (reputation) and making sure that the 
firm actually benefits (appropriability) are fundamental, rather than the traditional focus on 
centrality. The negative sign on voluntarism is a further indication that there is significant 
additional work to be done on strategic CSR, and that firms in Spain are uncertain as to how 
CSR actually creates value. The Spanish case is important in that Spain is today a strong 
economy with powerful MNEs that set the agenda for CSR not only in Spain but in much of 
Latin America. Of course, further research is required in other countries if we are to develop a 
clearer picture of the key elements involved in CSR value creation and provide managers with 
strong arguments to move ahead with strategic CSR. 
 
 
Appendix 1. Survey questions  
Visibility 
The purpose of participating in social action programs is to: 
• Improve the image of the firm 
• Increase the presence of the firm in the media  
Appropriability 
• The achievement of social objectives is necessary to reach financial 
objectives. Voluntarism (note: these items were reverse scaled). 
The purpose of participating in social action programs is to: 
• Fulfill legal obligations 
• Follow a regular practice in the industry 
• Obtain favorable tax treatment 
 
Value Creation 
• Influence customer purchase decisions 
• Obtain new customers 
• Develop new products and services 
• Open new markets 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Technical material 
In order to assess the reliability of the variables developed for this project, Cronbach’s alpha 
was calculated for each variable. Value creation (a ¼ 0.87) was found to have a satisfactory 
level of re- liability. Visibility (a ¼ 0.68) and voluntarism (a ¼ 0.69) were slightly less than the 
desired level of 0.70, but sufficient for use in this exploratory kind of research.25 Since 
appropriability was a single-item construct, reliability was not calculated.26 
Construct validity was evaluated by examining the convergent and discriminant validity of 
the measures. Convergent validity was assessed looking at the pairwise correlations between 
the items for each construct. All are significant at the p < 0.05 level, while 94% are significant at 
the p < 0.01 level. Therefore, there is evidence of convergent validity for the different 
measures. 
Discriminant validity is problematic in a survey instrument, which involves self-reports 
because of problems related to common method variance. In order to diminish these 
problems, we employed a number of methods. Among others, we avoided implying that one 
response was preferable to another, made all responses of equal effort, paid attention to item 
wording, used items that were less subject to bias, and provided clear instructions.27 
We also carried out  a post hoc analysis of the potential  problems associated with 
common method  variance using Harman’s one-factor test,28  which requires the researcher 
to do a factor analysis of the variables in order to determine if a single factor accounts for the 
majority of the co- variance in the independent and dependent variables. The variables did not 
load on a single factor and the most important factor did not account for more than 30.8% of 
the variance, suggesting that common method variance was not a significant problem. 
In order to test for multicollinearity we examined the variance inflation factor (VIF). VIF is 
one measure of the effect the other independent variables have on the variance of a 
regression coefficient. Large VIF values indicate high collinearity. All values of the VIF were 
below the suggested cutoff of 5.3.29 Thus, the problem of multicollinearity does not appear to 
be significant. The hierarchical regression analysis indicates that  the coefficients were 
generally stable, confirming that multicollinearity did not appear to be affecting the results 
significantly. 
A potential problem that may occur with cross-sectional data is heteroskedasticity, which is a 
relationship between the error terms over a range of independent variables. In order to test 
  
for the possibility of heteroskedasticity, we conducted White’s test. The test statistic, nR2 was 
76.54, less than the critical Chi-square value. Thus, we satisfy the assumption of homoskedasticity 
necessary for OLS. 
In order to examine non-response bias, we compared the early responders with late 
responders. This comparison shows no significant difference in firm size, participation in CSR 
projects, or in competitive environmental factors. In fact, there were no significant 
differences in the responses to any of the survey questions. Some analysts suggest that 
late responders are similar to non- responders.30 The fact that no significant differences in 
responses were found between early and late responders suggests that non-response bias is 
not a problem. 
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